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Note 
 
Changing Course to Navigate the Patent Safe 
Harbor Post-Momenta 
Emily M. Wessels*
It is a familiar scene: a patient receives a prescription from 
her physician and brings it to her local pharmacy. A pharma-
cist instinctively substitutes the prescribed brand-name drug 
with one of the many generic options, each made by a different 
pharmaceutical manufacturer.
 
1 The interchange is so seamless 
and familiar that consumers rarely give it a second thought. In 
fact, currently about three-quarters of prescriptions are filled 
with a generic drug.2
Thirty years ago the scene would have been strikingly dif-
ferent. In 1983, generic drugs accounted for less than twenty 
percent of prescriptions.
 
3
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; Pharm. D. 
2011, Drake University. Thank you to Professor Thomas F. Cotter for his con-
tinued insight and advice on this topic. I also owe many thanks to the excep-
tional board and staff members of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Dan-
ny Deveny and Robin Lehninger, who played an integral role in publishing 
this Note. Heartfelt thanks go to my friends and family, most notably my par-
ents, Richard and Beth Lentz, and my sister, Kristin, for their continuous en-
couragement. Finally, I thank my husband, Joe, for his enduring love and 
support. Copyright © 2014 by Emily M. Wessels. 
 But Congress’s enactment of the Drug 
 1. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRIC-
ING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 1 n.2 (2012), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588064.pdf (“A brand-name drug is a drug 
marketed under a proprietary, trademark-protected name.”); id. at 1 
(“[G]eneric drugs . . . are copies of approved brand-name drugs.”). 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 2 (estimating that the generic utilization rate is “about 
78 percent for drugs dispensed in retail settings”); Martha M. Rumore, The 
Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical Scales Bal-
anced, PHARMACY TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, http://www.pharmacytimes.com/ 
publications/supplement/2009/GenericSupplement0809/Generic 
-HatchWaxman-0809 (“[T]oday more than 70% of prescriptions are for gener-
ics . . . .”). 
 3. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2 (plac-
ing the generic utilization rate at 19% in 1984); Rumore, supra note 2 (“[P]re–
Hatch-Waxman generic prescriptions numbered 15%.”). 
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Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 19844 
marked a shift toward generic proliferation.5 The Act—also 
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (Hatch-Waxman)—
introduced an abbreviated pathway for U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval of generic drugs.6 Reflecting 
Congress’s desire to balance the interests of brand companies, 
generic manufacturers, and the public, Hatch-Waxman also 
contained a “safe harbor” provision shielding generic manufac-
turers from patent infringement liability for activities “reason-
ably related” to submitting information to the FDA.7 This pro-
vision was designed so that a generic can enter the market as 
soon as—but not before—the patent on the brand medication 
expires.8
Notably, since its enactment the scope of the safe harbor 
has progressively widened to apply to medical devices, research 
tools, and even information that is ultimately never included in 
an FDA submission.
  
9 The Federal Circuit’s 2011 decision in 
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC10
 
 4. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. 
 seemed to slow 
this momentum toward an unbound interpretation of the safe 
harbor. The Classen court appeared to draw a bright line strict-
ly limiting the application of the safe harbor doctrine to activi-
ties occurring before the FDA approves a drug for commercial 
 5. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2 (“In-
creased use of generic drugs can partly be attributed to the regulatory frame-
work that was established in the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.”).  
 6. Hatch-Waxman Act, §§ 101–106, 98 Stat. at 1585–97 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see also Keysha Bryant, 
Biosimilars: The Long and Winding Pathway to Approval, U.S. PHARMACIST: 
GENERIC DRUG REV., June 21, 2013, http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/s/ 
253/c/41438/.  
 7. Hatch-Waxman Act, § 202, 98 Stat. at 1603 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. § 271 (2006)); see also B. Scott Eidson, Note, How Safe Is the Harbor? 
Considering the Economic Implications of Patent Infringement in Section 
271(e)(1) Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1169, 1171–75 (2004) (discussing the en-
actment of Hatch-Waxman’s safe harbor).  
 8. See, e.g., Examining the Senate and House Versions of the “Greater Ac-
cess to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act”: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 124–25 (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief 
Counsel, FDA) (explaining that in enacting Hatch-Waxman, “Congress sought 
to ensure that, once the statutory patent protection and marketing exclusivity 
for . . . new drugs has expired, consumers would benefit from the rapid availa-
bility of lower priced generic versions of innovator drugs”).  
 9. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 10. 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013). 
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sale.11 The respite, however, was short lived. In August 2012, 
the Federal Circuit changed course in Momenta Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., an infringement 
suit between two manufacturers of enoxaparin, the generic ver-
sion of the complex drug Lovenox.12 The split Momenta panel 
held that Amphastar’s post-approval use of Momenta’s patent-
ed method for analyzing an enoxaparin sample was protected 
under the safe harbor because the FDA required the analysis 
as a condition of the generic’s continued drug approval.13 Judge 
Rader dissented, noting that the decision essentially rendered 
the patent worthless by sanctioning unrestricted, indefinite 
commercial infringement at the patentee’s expense.14
Although the Momenta court attempted to reconcile its 
holding with Classen, the two decisions’ treatments of the tem-
poral scope of the safe harbor are arguably at odds. Satisfactory 
resolution of this tension is needed to restore Hatch-Waxman’s 
intended balance between brand and generic drug manufactur-
ers. Momenta highlights the importance of timely resolution as 
the pharmaceutical industry prepares to usher in a new age of 
biopharmaceutical—or “biologic”—innovation.
  
15 Similar to the 
complex drug at issue in Momenta, large biologic molecules ne-
cessitate strict quality control analyses to demonstrate the 
“sameness” required to qualify as a “follow-on”16
 
 11. For commentary contemporaneous with Classen interpreting the deci-
sion as a bright-line limit, see, for example, Aaron F. Barkoff, Federal Circuit 
Confines 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor to Pre-Approval Activities, ORANGE BOOK BLOG 
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.orangebookblog.com/2011/08/federal-circuit 
-confines-271e1-safe-harbor-to-pre-approval-activities.html; Gray Buccigross, 
Safe-Harbor Provision of Hatch-Waxman Act Does Not Protect Post-Approval 
Research Activities, FDA L. UPDATE (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.fdalawblog 
.com/2011/10/articles/legislation/safe-harbor-provision-of-hatch-waxman-act 
-does-not-protect-post-approval-research-activities/. 
 product (which 
 12. 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).  
 13. Id. at 1357–59. 
 14. Id. at 1369–70 (Rader, J., dissenting).  
 15. See Ian Evans, Follow-on Biologics: A New Play for Big Pharma, 83 
YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 97, 99 (2010) (discussing the potential of biopharma-
ceuticals to reshape the face of medicine in light of a slowdown in traditional 
small-molecule pharmaceutical innovation). For purposes of this Note, the text 
refers to the terms biopharmaceutical and biologic interchangeably. 
 16. Compare Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1350–51 (explaining the complex re-
quirements for determining “sameness” between enoxaparin and Lovenox due 
to the drug’s molecular diversity), with FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE: QUALITY CON-
SIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PROTEIN 
PRODUCT 9–15 (2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM291134.pdf (de-
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is comparable to the biologic equivalent of a generic17
This Note advocates for a statutory scheme that narrows 
safe harbor protection for activities occurring after FDA ap-
proval and provides compensation to all affected patentees. The 
proposed changes would restore the balance between easing the 
barrier to competitors’ market entry and preserving the intel-
lectual property rights of patent holders responsible for phar-
maceutical innovation. It would also lay groundwork for the 
growth of a successful follow-on biologic regime. To this end, 
Part I provides a brief overview of the context, enactment, and 
judicial evolution of the safe harbor doctrine. Part I also pre-
sents a summary of the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Classen 
and Momenta. Part II examines the safe harbor’s application as 
a liability exception and extrapolates the likely consequences of 
the Momenta decision to the field of biopharmaceuticals. Part 
III concludes that the safe harbor should provide adequate rec-
ompense to patent holders, whether they are brand, generic, or 
follow-on manufacturers. Keeping the interests of both private 
and public stakeholders in mind, the proposed solution includes 
enhanced procedures for notifying follow-on manufacturers of 
potential infringement, as well as a reasonable royalty for all 
patent owners subjected to the safe harbor and a period of 
commercial exclusivity for those facing excused post-approval 
infringement. 
). If Mo-
menta is allowed to stand for the unfettered proposition that 
post-approval quality control processes are unenforceable 
against infringers, the result could chill an entire field of intel-
lectual property rights essential for the development of any sort 
of meaningful follow-on biologic market.  
I.  EVOLUTION OF THE SAFE HARBOR DOCTRINE   
The intersection of innovation, patent protection, and FDA 
regulation creates challenges unique to the pharmaceutical 
 
scribing the many different analytical factors involved in demonstrating simi-
larity between a follow-on biologic and reference product).  
 17. See JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34045, FDA 
REGULATION OF FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 1 & n.1 (2010), available at http:// 
primaryimmune.org/advocacy_center/pdfs/health_care_reform/Biosimilars_ 
Congressional_Research_Service_Report.pdf (explaining that “[a] follow-on 
biologic is similar but not identical to the brand-name . . . product,” and that 
although sometimes referred to “as biogenerics or generic biologics[, t]he FDA 
and many others consider the use of the word generic to be inaccurate because 
the term has been used, in the context of chemical drugs, to mean identical”); 
see also id. at 9–12 (discussing the unique scientific challenges associated with 
comparing follow-on biologics with the brand-name drugs). 
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field. This Part introduces the nuanced development of the law 
in these areas that resulted in the enactment of the safe harbor 
doctrine. It continues with an explanation the doctrine’s expan-
sion and finishes with a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s deci-
sions in Classen and Momenta. 
A. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY  
The U.S. pharmaceutical market is a multi-billion dollar 
industry with $330 billion in sales in 2012.18 The market tradi-
tionally has been dominated by small molecule drugs,19 which 
are chemicals with a “well-defined structure [that] can be thor-
oughly characterized.”20 Unfortunately, innovation of truly nov-
el small molecule pharmaceuticals has arguably slowed in re-
cent years.21 Instead, companies have concentrated resources 
on producing imitation “me-too” products.22 These drugs tend to 
target saturated markets and generally offer few advantages in 
terms of therapeutic benefits or favorable side effect profiles.23
Recent developments in biopharmaceuticals, however, rep-
resent a possible return to significant innovation.
  
24
 
 18. Worldwide Pharmaceutical Sales by Region 2010–2012, STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/272181/world-pharmaceutical-sales-by 
-region/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).  
 Biologics 
 19. See Biotech Products in Big Pharma Clinical Pipelines Have Grown 
Dramatically, TUFTS CENTER FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Nov. 14, 2013), http:// 
csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete_story/pr_ir_nov_dec_2013 (noting the “historical 
concentration on small molecule drugs”). 
 20. Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products, 
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/%20HowDrugs 
areDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologic 
Applications/ucm113522.htm (last updated Dec. 24, 2009).  
 21. See, e.g., Donald W. Light & Joel R. Lexchin, Pharmaceutical Research 
and Development: What Do We Get for All That Money?, BRIT. MED. J., Aug. 7, 
2012, at 22, 23 (“This is the real innovation crisis: pharmaceutical research 
and development turns out mostly minor variations on existing drugs . . . .”).  
 22. See AIDAN HOLLIS, ME-TOO DRUGS: IS THERE A PROBLEM? 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/Me-tooDrugs_ 
Hollis1.pdf (noting the increased “criticism on the drug industry for the in-
creasing extent to which investment appears to be focused on developing drugs 
which have a similar mechanism of action to pre-existing drugs”).  
 23. Id. at 1 (acknowledging the varying definitions of a me-too drug while 
defining it as “one that is approved after a pioneering drug and which is [com-
parable or similar] . . . and is not clinically superior”).  
 24. ERNST & YOUNG, BEYOND BORDERS: GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY RE-
PORT 1 (2007), available at http://www.biocity.co.uk/file-manager/Group/ 
reports2007/2007-beyondborders.pdf (“There is no question that biotechnology 
is now the engine of innovation for the drug development industry.”); Michael 
Pohlscheidt & Robert Kiss, Recent Advances and Trends in the Biotechnology 
Industry—Development and Manufacturing of Recombinant Proteins and An-
Wessels_MLR  
1570 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1565 
 
are complex molecules produced from living organisms.25 Bio-
logics are generally on the cutting edge of treatment, offering 
new therapeutic options for previously untreatable diseases.26 
It is projected that by 2015, biologics will account for $167 bil-
lion of U.S. pharmaceutical sales.27
The shift from small molecule drugs to biologics under-
scores a key public policy consideration: the need to balance in-
novation of new treatments with affordable access to these life-
saving therapies.
 
28 The recent skyrocketing of health care costs 
highlights the importance of this balancing act.29 On the one 
hand, experts estimate that bringing a new small-molecule 
therapy to market may cost as much as $1.3 billion in research 
and development (R&D).30 On the other, brand-name drugs can 
cost consumers hundreds of dollars.31
 
tibodies, AM. PHARMACEUTICAL REV., Sept./Oct. 2013, http://www 
.americanpharmaceuticalreview.com/Featured-Articles/148856-Recent 
-Advances-and-Trends-in-the-Biotechnology-Industry-Development-and 
-Manufacturing-of-Recombinant-Proteins-and-Antibodies/ (“A large number of 
[biologics] have been approved, delivering meaningful contributions to pa-
tients’ lives, and are anticipated to be the major growth driver for the industry 
in the upcoming years.”).  
  
 25. Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products, 
supra note 20.  
 26. What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www.fda 
.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/ 
ucm133077.htm (last updated Apr. 14, 2009). 
 27. Bhupinder Singh Sekhon & Vikrant Saluja, Biosimilars: An Overview, 
BIOSIMILARS, Mar. 14, 2011, at 1, 1.  
 28. LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, STIMULATING INNOVATION IN THE BIOLOG-
ICS INDUSTRY: A BALANCED APPROACH TO MARKETING EXCLUSIVITY 1 (2008), 
available at http://people.bu.edu/kotlikoff/New%20Kotlikoff%20Web%20Page/ 
Kotlikoff_Innovation_in_Biologics21.pdf (“The key issue in providing afforda-
ble access to biologic wonder drugs is doing so without limiting their develop-
ment.”). 
 29. The Skyrocketing Cost of U.S. Health Care: By the Numbers, THE 
WEEK, Mar. 30, 2012, http://theweek.com/article/index/226276/the 
-skyrocketing-cost-of-us-health-care-by-the-numbers.  
 30. Compare Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Esti-
mates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003) (calcu-
lating the cost of drug development as $802 million), and Joseph A. DiMasi & 
Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Differ-
ent?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 476 (2007) (using a time-
adjusted drug development cost of $1.318 billion), with Donald W. Light & Re-
becca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Re-
search, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 34, 46 (2011) (critiquing DiMasi et al. and placing 
the cost of drug development at a median of $43.4 million). But see Tufts 
CSDD’s Official Response to the Recent Light & Warburton Commentary, 
TUFTS CENTER FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Mar. 2011), http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/ 
complete_story/internal_news (responding to Light & Warburton’s critique in 
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The R&D costs are just as high, if not higher, for biolog-
ics.32 Biologics also take longer to develop and have a lower suc-
cess rate than small-molecule drugs.33 These consequences 
stem from the complexity of biologic molecules.34 Because bio-
logics are derivatives of living organisms, even small manufac-
turing differences can cause significant variations in the end 
product.35 The increased development costs are then passed on 
to consumers.36 To illustrate, the yearly cost of biologic therapy 
averages $16,425, compared to $730 for traditional pharmaceu-
ticals.37
Fortunately, market competition can help control consum-
ers’ costs.
  
38 The proliferation of generics demonstrates the bene-
ficial effects of competition. Since generic small molecule drugs 
have become widely available, these products have been substi-
tuted for brand-name drugs at an average cost savings of sev-
enty-five percent.39
 
support of DiMasi et al.).  
 It is further estimated that a successful 
biosimilars market could produce savings of up to forty per-
 31. See, e.g., Ganesan Marimuthu et al., Maintaining Patents Protecting 
Biologics or Small-Molecule Drugs, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 50, 50 (2012); 
Linda A. Johnson, Drug Prices to Plummet in Wave of Expiring Patents, 
NBCNEWS.COM (July 25, 2011, 1:44:43 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/ 
43882446/ns/health-health_care/t/drug-prices-plummet-wave-expiring-patents/ 
#.Us3j87Q0wqc. 
 32. See DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 30, at 475–76 (recognizing that 
overall figures for biologic development may be higher than traditional phar-
maceuticals depending on the accuracy of time-adjusted calculations).  
 33. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R 41483, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: THE LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS-
SUES 3–4 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41483.pdf 
[hereinafter SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES]. 
 34. See ANDREW F. BOURGOIN, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE 
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC MARKET IN THE U.S.: IMPLICATIONS, STRATEGIES, AND 
IMPACT 1 (2011), available at http://thomsonreuters.com/business-unit/science/ 
pdf/ls/newport-biologics.pdf (“[M]any [biologics] demand substantial invest-
ment to manufacture due to the product complexity.”).  
 35. SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note 33, 
at 15.  
 36. BOURGOIN, supra note 34, at 1 (“The high development cost of biologic 
products is often reflected in their price.”).  
 37. ROBERT J. SHAPIRO WITH KARAN SINGH & MEGHA MUKIM, THE PO-
TENTIAL AMERICAN MARKET FOR GENERIC BIOLOGICAL TREATMENTS AND THE 
ASSOCIATED COST SAVINGS 4 (2008), available at http://www.sonecon.com/ 
docs/studies/0208_GenericBiologicsStudy.pdf. 
 38. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1 (“The 
competition that brand-name drugs face from generic equivalents is associated 
with lower overall drug prices . . . .”).  
 39. Id. 
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cent,40
B. U.S. PATENT SYSTEM 
 demonstrating the importance of fostering competition 
as the biopharmaceutical field continues to grow.  
Faced with such high R&D costs, the patent system offers 
pharmaceutical companies an opportunity to recover some of 
those costs. A patent allows its holder to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the patented invention for a defined 
period of time.41 The U.S. system of exclusivity is grounded in 
an economic/utilitarian philosophy, providing the economic re-
ward of a limited monopoly as an incentive for conferring the 
“ultimate benefit to the public” through technological advance-
ment and increased institutional knowledge.42 The economic 
reward of exclusivity not only offers the patentee a chance to 
recoup its investment by singularly exploiting the technology, 
but the patentee may ultimately realize profits above and be-
yond the cost of innovation.43 Alternatively, the patent owner 
may license the invention for use by others, which generally in-
volves a reasonable royalty or other form of compensation to 
the patentee.44 It is this potential for significant return on in-
vestment that is a key driver of pharmaceutical innovation.45
Unrestrained exclusivity, however, undercuts the utilitari-
an underpinnings of the patent system.
  
46 It leads to overprotec-
tion and limits access to information, decreasing the net benefit 
to society.47
 
 40. BOURGOIN, supra note 
 U.S. patent law, therefore, does not grant unfet-
tered exclusivity. Rather, certain liability exceptions exist for 
34 (“At the individual product level, reports are 
estimating that biosimilars may cost between 60 and 80 percent of the refer-
ence biologic therapy upon market entry.”). 
 41. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006); see also id. §§ 101–03 (specifying that an 
inventive process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter that meets 
three basic requirements—namely utility, novelty, and nonobviousness—may 
be eligible for patent protection).  
 42. See Ruth E. Freeburg, Comment, No Safe Harbor and No Experi-
mental Use: Is It Time for Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools?, 53 BUFF. L. 
REV. 351, 358–59 (2005); see also Maureen O’Rourke, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1177, 1182 (2000) (“In the absence of some mechanism to allow the originator 
to at least recoup his or her investment, information will be under-produced.”). 
 43. See Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated Licensing: Effects 
on the Conflict Between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 711, 715–16 (2003). 
 44. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1) (describing the right to a reasonable royalty).  
 45. See Gillat, supra note 43. 
 46. See O’Rourke, supra note 42, at 1183. 
 47. Id. at 1183 n.16.  
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situations where society has determined that the benefits of ac-
cess to the invention outweigh the costs to the patent holder.48 
These liability exceptions limit the patent owner’s exclusive 
right to use or license the patented invention.49 In the interest 
of maintaining the balance between the economic and utilitari-
an underpinnings of the U.S. patent system, such exceptions 
are granted sparingly.50
C. FDA REGULATION 
  
Simply having a patent, however, does not give a pharma-
ceutical company an affirmative right to sell its product.51 A 
manufacturer must have an FDA-approved application before it 
can bring a drug to market.52 The scope of information required 
in the initial application makes the approval process expensive 
and time consuming, adding to the costs of R&D.53 The FDA 
can also condition continued approval on the collection of post-
approval safety and efficacy data.54
The approval process itself has evolved over time. In most 
circumstances, a company wanting to market a new, or “pio-
neer,” drug must file a New Drug Application (NDA) demon-
strating the drug is safe and effective.
  
55 Historically, another 
company wanting to sell its generic version of that drug also 
had to file its own NDA.56
 
 48. Gillat, supra note 
 Unfortunately, this system produced 
43, at 713–14.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 714 (describing the exceptions to patent exclusivity as “narrow 
and specific”).  
 51. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 
41114, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER 1 (2012), avail-
able at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/ 
R41114_03132013.pdf. 
 52. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012) (mandating FDA approval of “new drugs” 
and describing the application requirements); 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006) (requir-
ing the licensure of biologics). 
 53. ALAN MINSK ET AL., FOOD & DRUG LAW INST., THE 505(b)(2) NEW 
DRUG APPLICATION PROCESS: THE ESSENTIAL PRIMER ii (2010), available at 
http://www.fdli.org/resources/resources-order-box-detail-view/the-505%28b% 
29%282%29-new-drug-application-process-the-essential-primer (describing the 
studies required by the FDA as the “most time-consuming and expensive part 
of the drug development process”).  
 54. See 21 C.F.R. § 211.165 (2013).  
 55. 21 U.S.C. § 355.  
 56. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, PATENT LAW AND ITS APPLI-
CATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DRUG 
PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (“THE 
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT”) 20 (2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland 
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some unintended consequences. The NDA process could tie up 
years of patent exclusivity for the pioneer drug before the drug 
could enter the market.57 At the same time, later companies 
had to invest millions of dollars to produce the same safety and 
efficacy data provided by the pioneer company.58 Furthermore, 
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co. prevented generic manufacturers from 
conducting tests with the pioneer drug until the patent ex-
pired.59 This essentially granted the pioneer manufacturer a de 
facto extension of its monopoly during the time it took the ge-
neric company to perform the required studies.60 Delayed ge-
neric entry decreased market competition, keeping drug prices 
high.61
Congress responded to these unintended consequences by 
enacting Hatch-Waxman. Addressing the first issue, Hatch-
Waxman included limited patent term extensions to offset the 
delays associated with FDA approval.
 
62 Regarding the second 
concern, Hatch-Waxman introduced an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) pathway to eliminate the duplicity associ-
ated with requiring an NDA for subsequent versions of ap-
proved drugs.63
 
.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/rl3075601102005.pdf [hereinafter 
SCHACHT & THOMAS, EXAMINATION].  
 Rather than requiring independent safety and 
efficacy data, an ANDA allows a generic manufacturer to des-
ignate an already-approved product as a “reference” product 
and rely on the data included in the reference product’s NDA to 
 57. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (noting that it could take up to ten years for a drug to be approved 
after the NDA was submitted to the FDA), superseded by statute, Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585, as recognized in 
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Eliza-
beth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, 
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 588 (2003) (“[T]he 1962 
Amendments [to the FDA drug approval process] resulted in a significant ero-
sion of the term of exclusivity provided to pharmaceutical manufacturers un-
der the patent laws.”).  
 58. See Roche, 733 F.2d at 860 (describing federally mandated premarket-
ing tests); SCHACHT & THOMAS, EXAMINATION, supra note 56, at 20 (noting 
characterization of the requirement that generic manufacturers independently 
prove safety and effectiveness as “needlessly costly, duplicative and time-
consuming”); cf. supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing the high 
costs of drug development). 
 59. Roche, 733 F.2d at 861.  
 60. See Freeburg, supra note 42, at 366. 
 61. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 590.  
 62. Id. at 590–91. 
 63. Id. at 593–94.  
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meet the FDA’s approval criteria.64 The generic manufacturer 
need only demonstrate that its product is bioequivalent to the 
reference product.65 Finally, Hatch-Waxman created a process 
for resolving patent disputes before the generic is approved for 
market entry.66 The Act made it “an act of infringement to 
submit [an ANDA] . . . for a drug claimed in a patent or the use 
of which is claimed in a patent”67 and detailed a procedure for 
challenging those patents.68
The ANDA process itself, however, did not remedy the de 
facto patent extension ratified by the court in Roche. A generic 
manufacturer still could not commence the required bioequiva-
lence studies until the patents on the reference product ex-
pired.
  
69 Congress thus included a safe harbor provision in 
Hatch-Waxman to address this problem, essentially overturn-
ing Roche.70
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information 
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of 
drugs . . . .
 This provision, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), 
provides:  
71
The theory behind the safe harbor was that a generic man-
ufacturer could complete the necessary bioequivalence studies 
and receive approval of its ANDA during the life of the patent.
 
72 
But the generic manufacturer could not sell its product so long 
as the product or its use was covered by a patent, preserving 
the patent owner’s right to commercial exclusivity during the 
patent term by preventing the generic from entering the mar-
ket until the patent expired.73
 
 64. Id. at 594–95. 
  
 65. Id.; see also Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www 
.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100 
.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2013) (describing bioequivalence as “identical . . . 
in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance 
characteristics and intended use”).  
 66. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 595.  
 67. Hatch-Waxman Act, § 202, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 
(1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006)). 
 68. See id. §§ 201–202, 98 Stat. at 1598–1603; Weiswasser & Danzis, su-
pra note 57, at 595–603. 
 69. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 605. 
 70. Id.; see Hatch-Waxman Act, § 202, 98 Stat. at 1603 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).  
 71. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).  
 72. SCHACHT & THOMAS, EXAMINATION, supra note 56, at 25.  
 73. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984) [hereinafter Committee Re-
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Notably, Hatch-Waxman’s patent dispute resolution proce-
dures and ANDA provisions were implemented as amendments 
to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the statute that regulates 
small-molecule drugs.74 Most biologics, on the other hand, are 
regulated under the Public Health Services Act.75 As a conse-
quence, neither the patent term extension nor the ANDA pro-
cess introduced by Hatch-Waxman generally applies to biolog-
ics.76 Some portions of Hatch-Waxman, however, amended 
statutes outside the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.77 The safe 
harbor was one of these broader provisions and was incorpo-
rated as a general amendment to the Patent Act.78 As a result, 
the safe harbor is considered applicable to biologics.79
Because biologics were excluded from the ANDA provisions 
of Hatch-Waxman, until recently no procedure existed for ex-
pedited approval of follow-on biologics.
  
80
 
port] (“[Section 271(e)(1)] does not permit the commercial sale of a patented 
drug . . . .”); id. at pt. 2, at 30 (“In this case the generic manufacturer is not 
permitted to market the patented drug during the life of the patent . . . .”); see 
also Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286, 
and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 926 (1984) [hereinafter 
Hearing] (memorandum of Alfred B. Engelberg, Patent Counsel, Generic 
Pharmaceutical Industry Association) (agreeing on behalf of the Generic 
Pharmaceutical Industry Association that the safe harbor “does not authorize 
any activity which would deprive the patent owner of the sale of a single tablet 
during the life of a valid patent”). 
 Previously, a company 
wanting to market its version of an approved biologic had to fol-
low the same approval pathway as the pioneer and file its own 
 74. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL 33901, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION 
ISSUES 13 (2009), available at https://opencrs.com/document/RL33901/ [here-
inafter SCHACHT & THOMAS, INNOVATION ISSUES].  
 75. Id. at 3; Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological 
Products, supra note 20.  
 76. SCHACHT & THOMAS, INNOVATION ISSUES, supra note 74, at 13 (“To 
the extent that a particular biologic is approved under the auspices of the PHS 
Act, however, these provisions would be inapplicable.”). But see id. at 6 (“Be-
cause the definition of ‘drugs’ under the FDC Act is broad, however, the FDA 
states that ‘[b]iological products subject to the PHS Act also meet the defini-
tion of drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological 
Products, supra note 20)).  
 77. See id. at 13. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. See Jeanne Yang, Note, A Pathway to Follow-On Biologics, 3 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 217, 218 (2011). 
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Biologic License Application (BLA).81 Needless to say, the sys-
tem suffered from the same wasted resources problem that 
plagued the small-molecule approval process prior to Hatch-
Waxman.82 Expedited approval of follow-on biologics, however, 
presented its own unique challenges. First, developing a follow-
on biologic is generally much more costly than developing a ge-
neric small-molecule drug.83 Second, the complexity of biologic 
molecules can make it extremely difficult to demonstrate the 
“sameness” required to establish bioequivalence.84
Nevertheless, Congress turned its attention to establishing 
an abbreviated approval mechanism for biosimilars in the Bio-
logics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA).
  
85 
The BPCIA allows a company to designate an approved biologic 
as a reference product and file an Abbreviated Biologic License 
Application for approval of its follow-on product.86 The Act di-
vides these follow-on products into two categories: biosimilars 
and interchangeable biologics.87 To be biosimilar, the biologic 
must be “highly similar” to the reference product with no clini-
cally meaningful differences in safety, purity, or potency.88 An 
interchangeable biologic is a biosimilar “expected to produce 
the same clinical result as the reference product” such that 
switching between the two products presents no more risk to 
the patient than repeat administration with the reference 
product.89
 
 81. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2006); Biologics License Applications 
(BLA) Process (CBER), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/ 
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/BiologicsLicenseApplicationsBLAProcess/ (last 
updated Feb. 13, 2010). 
 An interchangeable can be freely substituted for the 
 82. See supra notes 56–65 and accompanying text.  
 83. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 80, at 219; Andrew Jack, Pharmaceuticals: 
Biosimilar Drugs Show the Copycats Keeping Up with Creators, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
FTFT000020131017e9ah0000h; Denise Myshko, What’s Ahead for Biosimilars, 
PHARMAVOICE (Feb. 2012), http://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/ 
Corporate/Press%20Room/IMS%20in%20the%20News/Documents/ 
PharmaVOICE0212-IMS-Biosimilars.pdf.  
 84. See, e.g., Sekhon & Saluja, supra note 27, at 2–3; Yang, supra note 80, 
at 230.  
 85. Though introduced separately in 2009, the BPCIA was ultimately in-
corporated into the Affordable Care Act. See Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010). 
 86. See id. § 7002(a)–(b), 124 Stat. at 804–15 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 
(2006)). 
 87. Id.  
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2).  
 89. Id. § 262(k)(4). 
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reference product.90 The first approved interchangeable biologic 
for each reference product is granted a period of market exclu-
sivity, the length of which varies depending on its commercial 
and litigation status.91
The statute also provides a mechanism for identifying and 
resolving patent disputes.
  
92 The BPCIA system differs from the 
Hatch-Waxman process, accounting for the fact that small dif-
ferences in manufacturing can significantly impact the end 
product and recognizing that novel, complex processes may be 
necessary to establish the high degree of similarity required for 
classification as a biosimilar.93 Unlike Hatch-Waxman’s focus 
on patented compounds and their methods of use, the BPCIA 
framework also facilitates challenges to patents on the “method 
of making” a drug.94 The ability to challenge these types of pa-
tents reflects the increased importance of manufacturing and 
quality control patents in the biologic industry.95
D. EXPANSION OF THE SAFE HARBOR
  
96
While its statutory language has remained relatively un-
changed since 1984, the reach of the safe harbor has not re-
 
 
 90. Id. § 262(i)(3). 
 91. Id. § 262(k)(6).  
 92. Id. § 262(l). 
 93. See Trevor Woodage, Blinded by (A Lack of) Science: Limitations in 
Determining Therapeutic Equivalence of Follow-On Biologics and Barriers to 
Their Approval and Commercialization, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, ¶¶ 5, 30, 
42–46. 
 94. Id. ¶ 30 (“Another important difference between the ANDA and [fol-
low-on biologic] approval pathways is that under [Hatch-Waxman], method-of-
production (or process) patents cannot be asserted. In contrast, the BPCIA al-
lows infringement actions against an entity ‘making’ the allegedly infringing 
product, so method-of-production patents can be asserted against [follow-on 
biologic] sponsors.”). Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (“The [NDA] appli-
cant shall [include] . . . any patent which claims the drug . . . or which claims a 
method of using such drug . . . .”), with 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)–(3) (2006) (requir-
ing the follow-on applicant to provide the reference product sponsor with a 
copy of its application and “such other information that describes the process 
or processes used to manufacture the biological product” and allowing the 
product sponsor to list all patents potentially infringed based on that infor-
mation). 
 95. See Woodage, supra note 93 (discussing the challenges facing follow-on 
manufacturers caused by the scientific and regulatory differences between bio-
logics and small molecule drugs); see also infra notes 200–03 and accompany-
ing text.  
 96. Rather than attempting to be comprehensive, this section presents a 
representative selection of cases interpreting the safe harbor in the years since 
its enactment.  
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mained static. Rather, important questions about the proper 
interpretation of § 271(e)(1) have led to judicial decisions signif-
icantly enlarging its protections in the intervening decades 
since its enactment.97
1. Previous Judicial Developments 
 More recently, two Federal Circuit deci-
sions have focused renewed attention on the question of the 
safe harbor’s scope.  
Reflecting a generally liberal approach to the safe harbor, 
courts have endorsed a broad interpretation of § 271(e)(1)’s 
text.98 In one of the first landmark safe harbor decisions, the 
Supreme Court extended the safe harbor beyond its statutory 
“drug” language and declared that § 271(e)(1) applies to medi-
cal devices as well.99 Courts have also interpreted the word 
“solely” such that safe harbor protection can exist even if sub-
mission requirements under federal law are not the only, or 
even the primary, motivating factor behind the infringing ac-
tion.100 The Supreme Court has further construed the term 
“solely” to support its conclusion that the safe harbor does not 
categorically deny protection to activities that ultimately do not 
result in a submission to the FDA.101
2. Recent Federal Circuit Interpretations 
  
More recently, the Federal Circuit issued two critical deci-
sions interpreting the scope of the safe harbor. First was 
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC in August 
 
 97. See Eidson, supra note 7, at 1180.  
 98. See, e.g., Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 
1520, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 
1269, 1279–80 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 99. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (reasoning 
that safe harbor protection applies to medical devices because even though 
they were not specifically included in the statutory text, they are subject to 
lengthy FDA regulatory approval processes similar to the drug approval pro-
cess that motivated the enactment of Hatch-Waxman).  
 100. See, e.g., Telectronics, 982 F.2d 1520 (“Federal Circuit precedents indi-
cate that . . . ulterior motives or alternate purposes do not preclude application 
of the section 271(e)(1) exemption.”); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 
Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107–08 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron 
Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).  
 101. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005) 
(“[T]he use of patented compounds in preclinical studies is protected under 
§ 271(e)(1) as long as there is a reasonable basis for believing that the experi-
ments will produce ‘the types of information that are relevant to a [new drug 
application].’”). 
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2011.102 The Classen plaintiff sued several biotech companies 
for infringing its various patents on methods for evaluating and 
improving immunization schedules.103 The allegedly infringing 
activities involved evaluating vaccination schedules of already-
approved vaccines.104 The defendants argued that these activi-
ties were protected under the safe harbor doctrine because they 
were “reasonably related” to regulations that required vaccine 
manufacturers to review and report adverse reactions to the 
FDA.105
A split panel—with Judge Moore dissenting—rejected the 
defendants’ argument, holding that the safe harbor “does not 
apply to information that may be routinely reported to the 
FDA, long after marketing approval has been obtained.”
  
106 The 
court continued to conclude that the defendants’ activities were 
not immune because they were “not related to producing infor-
mation for a [new drug application], and [were] not a ‘phase of 
research’ possibly leading to marketing approval.”107 Legal 
commentary interpreted this decision as endorsing a strict pre-
approval limitation on the safe harbor’s scope.108
Then, in August 2012, the Federal Circuit issued a seem-
ingly conflicting decision in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals.
  
109 Momenta involved a suit be-
tween two generic manufacturers over a patented method for 
analyzing samples of the complex drug enoxaparin.110 Because 
of the molecular diversity of enoxaparin, the FDA had pre-
scribed five criteria generic companies would need to satisfy to 
establish bioequivalence for purposes of an ANDA, including 
analysis of the molecular identity of the drug.111
 
 102. 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013). 
 The FDA fur-
 103. Id. at 1060; see also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 
No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006); Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452, 454 (D. Md. 
2005). 
 104. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070. 
 105. Id.; Classen, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 455.  
 106. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070. 
 107. Id. at 1072.  
 108. See, e.g., Barkoff, supra note 11; Buccigross, supra note 11; see also 
Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1369 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[T]he [Classen] parties and the amici cer-
tainly thought Classen turned on a pre-/post-approval distinction.”), cert. de-
nied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).  
 109. 686 F.3d 1348. 
 110. Id. at 1349. 
 111. Id. at 1350. 
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ther specified that continued analysis of each batch of drug was 
required to maintain marketing approval.112 The patent-in-suit, 
directed to satisfying these requirements, was assigned to Mo-
menta,113 which claimed that Amphastar infringed the patent 
“by ‘manufacturing generic enoxaparin for commercial sale’ us-
ing the claimed methods”114 to test “each commercial batch of 
enoxaparin [to] be sold after FDA approval.”115
Focusing on the statutory language, Judge Moore’s majori-
ty opinion rejected Momenta’s argument that Classen had deci-
sively limited safe harbor protection to pre-approval activi-
ties.
 
116 The court determined that Amphastar’s post-approval 
uses of the patented method fell squarely under the safe harbor 
because “the requirement to maintain records for FDA inspec-
tion satisfie[d] the requirement that the uses be reasonably re-
lated to the development and submission of information to the 
FDA.”117 The court distinguished Classen on the grounds that 
the specific studies performed in that case were not mandated 
by the FDA.118 The court further declined to condition its exten-
sion of the safe harbor to post-approval activities on the ab-
sence of non-infringing alternatives, allowing competitors “the 
freedom to use an otherwise patented means to develop the 
necessary information” even when non-infringing methods ex-
ist.119
 
 112. Id. at 1352 (“FDA requires a generic manufacture to include in its 
manufacturing process the analysis of each batch of its enoxaparin drug sub-
stance to confirm that . . . [it] includes a 1, 6-anhydro ring structure.” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Letter from FDA to Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(July 23, 2010))). 
  
 113. Id. at 1351. 
 114. Id. at 1352. 
 115. Id. at 1353.  
 116. Id. at 1353, 1358–60.  
 117. Id. at 1357.  
 118. Id. at 1358 (“This case, however, fits well within Classen because the 
information submitted is necessary both to the continued approval of the 
ANDA and to the ability to market the generic drug. . . . The submissions to 
the FDA in this case are anything but ‘routine’—they implicate Amphastar’s 
very ability to continue its FDA approval for its ANDA and to continue manu-
facturing and marketing enoxaparin under its ANDA. We also note that, un-
like in Classen where the patented studies performed were not mandated by 
the FDA, the information here is not generated voluntarily by the manufac-
turer but is generated by FDA requirements the manufacturer is obligated 
under penalty of law to follow. Under such circumstances, the information can 
be said to have been gathered solely for submission to the FDA and not, as in 
Classen, primarily for non-FDA purposes.”). 
 119. Id. at 1359 (“This makes good sense because it . . . . avoids the situa-
tion here, where a drug has received approval, but is nevertheless kept from 
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Judge Rader issued a strongly worded dissent, critiquing 
the majority’s purported failure to adequately consider the 
purpose of the statute in light of the “not plainly comprehensi-
ble” text.120 Citing extensively to the legislative history of 
Hatch-Waxman, Judge Rader maintained that Congress clearly 
intended the safe harbor to be limited to pre-approval activities 
in order to balance competition and innovation.121 He empha-
sized that the majority’s contrary interpretation endorsed “con-
tinuous, commercial infringing sales during any portion of the 
life of the patent.”122 Judge Rader also took issue with the ma-
jority’s construction of the word “submission” to mean the re-
quired retention of records that may or may not be inspected by 
the FDA123 and its acceptance that the statutory requirement 
that infringement be “solely for uses reasonably related” to the 
development of required data could be satisfied by uses “pri-
marily for production of a commercial product.”124 In conclusion, 
Judge Rader foreshadowed that the majority’s extension of the 
safe harbor would “essentially render manufacturing method 
patents worthless.”125
II.  CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THE SAFE 
HARBOR   
 
Momenta is a landmark decision as the first extension of 
safe harbor protection to activities that occur after FDA ap-
proval.126 Its practical consequences for the patentee—as high-
lighted by Judge Rader—also demonstrate that the safe harbor 
presents an outdated model for an evolving pharmaceutical in-
dustry that places increased emphasis on manufacturing meth-
ods.127
 
the market based on an FDA mandated testing requirement.”).  
 This Part explores why biologics and other complex 
 120. Id. at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtron-
ic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1366. 
 123. Id. at 1367 (“This new interpretation would allow almost all activity 
by pharmaceutical companies to constitute ‘submission’ and therefore justify a 
free license to trespass.”). 
 124. Id. at 1374. 
 125. Id. at 1369. 
 126. See, e.g., Isabelle Blundell, Safe Harbor Protects Post-Approval Activi-
ties, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2012, at 11, 11, 
available at http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/safe-harbor-protects-post 
-approval-activities/4518/. 
 127. See Terry G. Mahn & Dr. Erin L. Baker, Is the Safe Harbor Too Safe 
for Certain Biologic Patents?, PHARMACEUTICAL COMPLIANCE MONITOR (Aug. 
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drugs do not fit neatly into the current framework of the safe 
harbor. It reaches the conclusion that neither limiting the safe 
harbor to pre-approval experimentation nor expanding protec-
tion to all post-approval activities would adequately promote 
Hatch-Waxman’s intended balance between innovation and ac-
cess in today’s pharmaceutical landscape. 
A. THE SAFE HARBOR AS A LIABILITY EXCEPTION  
Section 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor operates as one of the few 
liability exceptions granted under U.S. patent law.128 It excuses 
certain, otherwise infringing practices encompassed by the 
statutory language and terminates the patent owner’s right to 
exclude with respect to those practices.129
1. Balancing Stakeholder Interests: Patentees’ Rights 
 In order to best eval-
uate the practical implications of applying the current safe 
harbor exemption to the field of biologics, one must first exam-
ine the underlying policy considerations of imposing a liability 
exception.  
Liability exceptions arise out of a desire to excuse certain 
infringing activities.130 Several existing exceptions in U.S. pa-
tent law, including the safe harbor, reflect a “public benefit” 
theory—a desire to “allow socially beneficial uses that generate 
large positive externalities.”131 Under this theory, exceptions 
are justified when the net public benefit outweighs the intru-
sion on the private rights granted to the patent holder.132
The existence and scope of an exception based in public 
benefit theory therefore represents a balancing of stakeholder 
interests between the patentee and the public. Specifically, the 
  
 
16, 2013), http://www.pharmacompliancemonitor.com/is-the-safe-harbor-too 
-safe-for-certain-biologic-patents/5396/ (“The implications of Momemta [sic] 
are particularly significant for biologic manufacturers who are required to 
maintain and provide to FDA, batch-by-batch data on drugs being offered for 
commercial sale.”); supra notes 93–95, 122, 125 and accompanying text. 
 128. See O’Rourke, supra note 42, at 1197–98; see also supra notes 46–50 
and accompanying text (discussing liability exceptions in U.S. patent law). 
 129. See, e.g., Patcharin Pisut, Freedom to Research: Room for Trial and 
Error in Drug Development After Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 
2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 339, 339.  
 130. See O’Rourke, supra note 42, at 1181; supra text accompanying note 
48.  
 131. Id. at 1197–98 (listing examples of “situations in which the public 
benefit from the infringement may be so great that it outweighs the patentee’s 
interest in its exclusive rights”).  
 132. Id. 
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greater the benefit and the smaller the intrusion, the more jus-
tified the exception—and vice versa.133 Due to the substantial 
intrusion on the patentee’s rights, infringement that furthers 
direct commercial competition weighs significantly against 
granting an exception for such activities.134
2. Balancing Stakeholder Interests: Impact on Innovation  
 
In addition to the individual costs to the patentee, social 
costs imposed by a disincentive to innovate can decrease the 
net public benefit.135 Patent exclusivity not only offers an oppor-
tunity to recover costs associated with invention, but it also in-
cludes the lure of a substantial return on investment if an in-
vention is successful.136 These potential revenues are often a 
strong driver behind innovation.137 If these exclusivity incen-
tives are removed—not only limiting the opportunity to recoup 
costs but increasing the risk of loss—the motive to invent can 
often disappear with them.138 Thus while the public may benefit 
from a liability exception through increased access to a particu-
lar invention, any corresponding slowdown in innovation and 
advancement caused by the exception detracts from its overall 
net benefit.139
Several factors influence the scope and likelihood of a po-
  
 
 133. See O’Rourke, supra 42, at 1189 (using copyright law to explain the 
doctrine of positive externalities for later discussion within the context of pa-
tent law). The importance of minimizing intrusion on the patentee’s rights is 
echoed in the international arena. See id. at 1201 (“[Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement m]embers may provide lim-
ited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the pa-
tent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”). 
 134. See id. at 1204–05 (noting a lack of authority “support[ing] excusing 
commercial infringement that occurs in the marketing of a directly infringing 
product”).  
 135. See, e.g., WILLIAM JACK, PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH ECONOMICS FOR DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 180 (1999); O’Rourke, supra note 42, at 1182–83 (de-
scribing the underproduction of information associated with the public goods 
problem). 
 136. See Gillat, supra note 43, at 715–16 (“It has been proposed that inno-
vation is stimulated not merely by the potential of recouping the costs of R&D 
and capturing profits. Rather, it is stimulated also by the skew of the reward 
distribution; in other words, by the odds—however small—of hitting the ‘jack-
pot’ and to be one of the small minority of inventions that collect spectacular 
profits.”).  
 137. See id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
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tential slowing in innovation caused by limiting a patent hold-
er’s right to exclusivity.140 These factors include the market sig-
nificance of competing activities, the predictability of losing pa-
tent exclusivity, and the availability of alternative means for 
recouping costs and reaping profits.141 Notably, these factors 
present unique considerations in the context of pharmaceutical 
innovation, which is particularly sensitive to the financial in-
centives of the patent system.142
a. Market Significance 
  
A first—and arguably most substantial—factor presaging 
an undesirable effect on innovation is market significance.143 In 
this context, market significance depends on the degree of com-
petition between the patent holder and the entity practicing the 
unauthorized use.144 It also correlates with the expected market 
harm to the patentee.145 Direct competition between an unau-
thorized user and an established product or service of the pa-
tentee has high market significance.146 Market significance is 
lower, however, if the unauthorized use involves an untested 
product or the parties operate in different markets.147 The lower 
the market significance, the less likely the unauthorized use 
will negatively impact the patent holder’s potential profits.148 
The smaller the potential impact on the patentee’s return on 
investment, the less likely financial considerations will deter 
innovation.149 On the other hand, the higher the market signifi-
cance and risk of financial injury is, the greater the patentee’s 
disincentive to innovate.150
 
 140. See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: 
Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 873 (2003) (using a compulsory licensing format to 
explore factors affecting pharmaceutical companies’ incentive to innovate); 
Gillat, supra note 
  
43, at 716 (“[I]nnovation is highly responsive to economic 
stimuli. Incentives to innovate depend on[, among other things,] . . . the rate 
and ease at which competitive imitation of the innovation occurs.”). 
 141. See infra Part II.A.2(a)–(c). 
 142. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in 
Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 98–99 (2000). 
 143. Chien, supra note 140, at 873, 879–80.  
 144. Id. at 873. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Gillat, supra note 43, at 716–17. 
 150. See id.  
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In a pharmaceutical context, generic small molecule drugs 
and interchangeable biosimilars represent products with the 
greatest market significance. These products are direct compet-
itors because they can be substituted for the respective refer-
ence product without prescriber intervention.151 In fact, some 
states require that pharmacists substitute a generic for the 
brand drug unless the prescriber specifically requests the lat-
ter.152 Distinct drugs in the same therapeutic class also general-
ly have high market significance as they “compete for essential-
ly the same population of patients” and may be “virtually 
indistinguishable” with respect to safety and effectiveness.153 
This category likely includes biosimilars that do not meet the 
criteria for interchangeability.154 Still, these products have a 
lesser effect on profits than direct substitutes.155 Drugs from 
different classes used to treat the same condition may also have 
some market significance, but the level of competition between 
such products is often minimized by important differences in 
effectiveness or side effects.156
Notably, because of its relationship with competition, mar-
ket significance also corresponds with the degree of consumer 
 This same logic suggests that ab-
sent extenuating circumstances, the market significance of in-
dividual drugs used to treat different diseases is minimal. 
 
 151. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3) (2006) (defining an interchangeable biologic 
as a biosimilar that can be substituted “without the intervention of the 
healthcare provider”); William H. Shrank et al., State Generic Substitution 
Laws Can Lower Drug Outlays Under Medicaid, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1384 
(2010) (explaining generic substitution laws); see also supra notes 33–34 and 
accompanying text.  
 152. Shrank et al., supra note 151.  
 153. David A. Kessler et al., Therapeutic-Class Wars—Drug Promotion in a 
Competitive Market, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1350 (1994) (explaining the 
“highly competitive marketplace” among drugs in discrete therapeutic classes). 
 154. Alfred B. Engelberg et al., Balancing Innovation, Access, and Profits—
Market Exclusivity for Biologics, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1917, 1918 (2009) (“If 
biosimilar products are not similarly interchangeable with the original biologic 
product, they could not be substituted for the original and would have to be 
marketed to physicians as therapeutic alternatives. . . . The market for [these] 
biosimilar products is likely to resemble that for new members of a chemical 
class that already has established therapeutic value.”).  
 155. Id.  
 156. See, e.g., Atholl Johnston et al., Effectiveness, Safety and Cost of Drug 
Substitution in Hypertension, 70 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 320, 322–
23 (2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2949902/ 
pdf/bcp0070-0320.pdf (explaining that although switching between two differ-
ent classes of blood pressure medications is common, differences in safety, ef-
fectiveness, and drug interactions impact the desirability of the interchange).  
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cost savings realized by the introduction of another product.157 
Direct substitutes, with their highest market significance, also 
produce the greatest price decreases.158 The addition of distinct 
competitors in the same (or another) therapeutic class, howev-
er, does not necessarily result in significantly lower prices be-
cause usurping sales from the established drug requires pre-
scriber intervention.159 In fact, companies can sometimes charge 
more for a new drug, even in an already-crowded class.160 And 
“entirely new classes of compounds to treat a disease or condi-
tion are often priced at a premium relative to older classes.”161
b. Predictability 
  
A second factor affecting the incentive to innovate is the 
foreseeability of lost or diminished exclusivity.162 A key variable 
of this factor is whether the exception is applied to existing 
technology or future developments.163 When an unpredictable 
reduction in exclusivity is granted on existing technology, it 
may be too late to make any significant strategy alterations, 
minimizing the impact on innovation.164 If a company is able to 
predict that a certain project will be subject to lessened patent 
protection, however, it can prospectively alter its course of ac-
tion related to the technology.165 Adjustments may include re-
ducing investment in the project or abandoning it altogether.166
 
 157. See, e.g., Engelberg et al., supra note 
 
154, at 1918 (contrasting the 
market for drugs in the same therapeutic class “from that for small-molecule 
generics, in which interchangeability creates intense price competition that 
swiftly reduces the market share of the expensive branded product”).  
 158. Id. 
 159. Kessler et al., supra note 153 (“Traditional economics might sug-
gest . . . that a late entry would have to be priced below its competitors to win 
a market share. Sometimes this is the case. However, companies also rely on 
the widely held notion—not always true—that what is newer is better and is 
therefore worth more.”). 
 160. Id. (“Aggressive advertising campaigns and lack of information among 
prescribing physicians about comparative costs can facilitate the higher pric-
ing of ‘me too’ drugs.”).  
 161. JOSEPH A. DIMASI, PRICE TRENDS FOR PRESCRIPTION: PHARMACEUTI-
CALS: 1995–1999 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drug 
-papers/dimassi/dimasi-final.htm.  
 162. Chien, supra note 140, at 873.  
 163. See id. (“Unpredictable licenses that cover only existing technologies 
are more limited in scope than those that are predictable and cover future in-
ventions.”). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 873–74. 
 166. Id. at 874.  
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Thus, even academics who downplay diminished exclusivity’s 
potential to stifle innovation recognize that such an effect is 
more likely under a system that applies exceptions liberally.167
As previously discussed, since its enactment the safe har-
bor’s protections have been applied with growing frequency to 
an increasing number of settings.
  
168
c. Availability of Alternative Means for Recouping Costs  
 This trend toward a broad 
interpretation increases the chance that a particular pharma-
ceutical development will be subject to lost exclusivity under 
the safe harbor. Although each new widening of the safe harbor 
may come too late to affect existing R&D, pharmaceutical com-
panies have the ability to tailor future developments to avoid 
circumstances where the courts have interpreted § 271(e)(1) to 
apply broadly.  
Taken together, the first two factors demonstrate that a li-
ability exemption combining high market significance and 
great predictability can result in a significant disincentive to 
innovate.169 Nonetheless, even an adverse impact on innovation 
caused by high market significance and predictability may be 
mitigated by alternative means for recouping return on in-
vestment.170 Trade secrecy is the most comparable alternative 
to patenting for protecting the value of an invention that would 
otherwise have limited or no patent protection.171 Such an ap-
proach, however, can decrease overall social welfare by reduc-
ing the amount of information publicly available.172 An entity 
may alternatively increase revenues by raising prices.173
 
 167. See, e.g., Joseph A. Yosick, Note, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Ef-
ficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1292; see also Gillat, supra 
note 
 But in 
a truly competitive market, this is generally not a viable option 
43, at 717 (“A compulsory license that is relatively easy to obtain and that 
involves low royalties set by someone other than the patentee has a potential 
negative effect on the incentives for innovation.”). 
 168. See supra Part I.D. 
 169. Chien, supra note 140, at 879–80.  
 170. See Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: 
An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 
304 (1994) (exploring the various options available to companies faced with 
lost patent exclusivity). 
 171. Gillat, supra note 43, at 723. 
 172. See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 
1348, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) (explaining the information 
disclosure problems associated with keeping inventions secret), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013). 
 173. Fisch, supra note 170, at 305. 
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as sales will simply shift to the cheaper alternative.174 A third 
option is to decrease expenditures.175 Unfortunately, limited ex-
penditures can raise serious questions about resource alloca-
tion affecting R&D.176
On the whole, the pharmaceutical industry is foreclosed 
from many of the alternative means for recouping investment 
costs. The extreme disclosure requirements associated with 
FDA approval make trade secret protection unfeasible.
  
177 As far 
as raising revenues, a competitive market with generic en-
trants forecloses the option of increased prices.178 A company 
operating in a truly competitive market also likely would be as 
ill-advised in cutting advertising expenditures as in raising 
prices—either option is apt to result in a loss of market 
share.179 The bulk of a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s remain-
ing expenditures consist of R&D.180 As a result, a manufacturer 
needing to compensate for the lost value of patent exclusivity 
without raising prices would be most inclined to reduce risk.181 
This could mean limiting research to more reliable, less-
cutting-edge developments182 or cutting R&D expenditures al-
together,183 either of which foreshadows a corresponding de-
crease in innovation.184
 
 174. Id. at 306–07 (“Price theory teaches that in a competitive market-
place, a seller will not profit from a unilateral price increase because purchas-
ers will select a less expensive substitute.”).  
  
 175. Id. at 308.  
 176. See id. at 308–13.  
 177. Gillat, supra note 43, at 723 (“The most obvious alternative protec-
tion—trade secrecy—is not an option for the pharmaceutical industry because 
detailed disclosure is required for purposes of approval of the drug, and then 
for marketing. This is amplified by patent law rules and the industry’s ten-
dency to patent its compounds and processes at an early stage of re-
search . . . .”).  
 178. Fisch, supra note 170, at 307 (“[P]harmaceutical companies cannot 
expect to create a healthy balance sheet by increasing prices on pharmaceuti-
cals in a competitive marketplace.”). 
 179. Id. at 306–11. 
 180. Id. at 308–13.  
 181. See id. at 311–12.  
 182. Id. at 312 (“A pharmaceutical company seeking to reduce risk by di-
versifying into less risky . . . research and development will likely seek out ac-
tivities in which it already possesses existing expertise. . . . In such a scenario, 
pharmaceutical research and development is curtailed to achieve the reduced 
risk via diversification.”). 
 183. Id. (“[A] pharmaceutical company may attempt to achieve a healthy 
balance sheet by reducing expenditures on research, development, and test-
ing.”).  
 184. See id. at 312–13 (“The result of reducing risks by not developing 
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Importantly, an aversion to risk is likely to disproportion-
ately affect the developing field of biologics and biosimilars. Not 
only are the development costs higher, but much of the technol-
ogy is still theoretical and success is uncertain.185 Without the 
promise of exclusive commercial exploitation and the potential 
windfall of a successful product, many companies will expected-
ly shy away from biosimilars altogether in favor of less risky 
investments.186 A shift in resources will temper the current 
momentum toward finding breakthrough biologic treatments 
for otherwise untreatable diseases, decreasing the public’s 
overall access to effective healthcare.187
B. THE SAFE HARBOR’S IMPACT ON INNOVATION  
 In sum, the lack of 
practical alternatives for recovering costs means the imposition 
of a highly significant, highly predictable system denying pa-
tent exclusivity in the field of pharmaceuticals would make a 
reduction in innovation almost inevitable.  
As just demonstrated, the balance between the benefits 
and costs of a liability exception is strongly weighted in favor of 
the benefits when the impact on the patentee’s market is min-
imal. Not only does protecting the market curtail the patentee’s 
specific costs, but it diminishes the risk of a negative impact on 
innovation, maximizing overall social welfare and information 
production. Pre-Momenta, the combination of two factors kept 
the safe harbor’s market impact in check: (1) the restriction of 
the safe harbor to pre-approval activities; and (2) the historical 
dominance of small molecule drugs. Post-Momenta, these fac-
tors no longer function to adequately curb market harm to the 
patentee.  
1. Pre-Momenta Safeguards  
The first factor traditionally limiting the safe harbor’s 
 
pharmaceuticals that might be [subject to lost exclusivity] is the same as re-
ducing risks through diversification—a decrease in the creation of break-
through pharmaceuticals. . . . Studies [also] indicate that the level of spending 
on research, development, and testing directly corresponds with the creation of 
new pharmaceuticals. . . . Accordingly, reducing research, development, and 
testing expenditures would most likely result in the reduction, and possibly 
the elimination, of the creation of breakthrough pharmaceuticals.”); see also 
SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note 33, at 3.  
 185. See BOURGOIN, supra note 34, at 4–5. 
 186. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note 
33, at 13.  
 187. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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market impact was the lack of jurisprudence extending safe 
harbor protection after FDA approval.188 Restricting the safe 
harbor to pre-approval activities shields pharmaceutical patent 
holders from market harm by excluding essentially all commer-
cially significant activities from protection.189 Because a drug 
cannot be sold until approved, pre-approval infringement does 
not result in significant commercial competition for the patent 
holder;190 continued unauthorized use after approval to com-
mercialize a product would expose the unauthorized user to in-
fringement liability.191 Competitors faced with such a pre-
approval restriction must therefore refrain from unauthorized 
sales of an infringing product until the relevant patents expire 
or risk an infringement suit.192
Even absent an explicit restriction limiting the safe har-
bor’s scope to pre-approval activities, the established domi-
nance of small molecule drugs has been a second factor limiting 
market harm. Specifically, the relatively straightforward na-
ture of small molecule drug development creates a de facto bar-
rier to post-approval commercial competition.
 Either way, the patent holder’s 
commercial exclusivity expectations are preserved during the 
life of the patent.  
193 Because “small 
molecule drugs . . . can [generally] be synthesized relatively 
easily and characterized readily with laboratory techniques,”194
 
 188. See supra note 
 
126 and accompanying text.  
 189. See, e.g., Committee Report, supra note 73, pt. 1, at 45 (“This section 
does not permit the commercial sale of a patented drug by the party using the 
drug to develop such information . . . .”); id. pt. 2, at 30 (noting that the inter-
ference from the limited testing of a drug for approval purposes is “de 
minimus”). But see id. pt. 1, at 45 (“[I]t does permit the commercial sale of re-
search quantities of active ingredients to such party.”). 
 190. See Hearing, supra note 73, at 926 (memorandum of Alfred B. 
Engelberg, Patent Counsel, Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association) 
(“[T]he limited testing activity required to obtain FDA approval of a generic 
drug would not normally result in the use of even a single generic tablet for its 
therapeutic purpose during the life of a valid patent.”).  
 191. Committee Report, supra note 73, pt. 2, at 30 (“[T]he generic manufac-
turer is not permitted to market the patented drug during the life of the pa-
tent . . . .”).  
 192. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).  
 193. See Woodage, supra note 93, ¶ 11 (“Because small-molecule drugs . . . 
have simple chemical structures, it is relatively easy to establish chemical 
identity between a generic competitor and its corresponding reference prod-
uct.”). 
 194. Therapeutic Research Center, Approval of Generic Enoxaparin 
(Lovenox), PHARMACIST’S LETTER/PRESCRIBER’S LETTER, Sept. 2010, at 1, 1, 
available at http://pharmacytechniciansletter.therapeuticresearch.com/pl/ 
detaildocuments/260902.pdf?cs=&s=PTL. 
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protection for small-molecules is focused on patents claiming 
either the product itself or a method of using the product to 
treat a particular condition.195 Prior to approval, unauthorized 
use of these patented compounds or methods has value related 
to information production but cannot result in drug sales.196 Af-
ter approval, however, the value of the compound or treatment 
method is generally associated with commercial sales.197 This 
commercial consumption lacks a nexus to FDA requirements.198
2. Post-Momenta Considerations  
 
Without that nexus, most post-approval unauthorized uses fall 
outside the safe harbor’s statutory language specifying the use 
be related to submitting information required by law.  
Unfortunately, evolution of the safe harbor and the phar-
maceutical industry has eroded the effectiveness of these im-
plicit safeguards, leaving the safe harbor in need of reform for 
the twenty-first century. Still, neither strictly limiting the safe 
harbor to pre-approval activities (Classen) nor unrestrictedly 
expanding it post-approval (Momenta) adequately balances in-
novation and access in a complex-molecule drug market. The 
Momenta decision itself highlights the significant shortcomings 
of such a bright-line distinction.  
a. The Reduced Benefits of a Pre-Approval Limitation  
Hatch-Waxman’s expedited market entry for generic com-
petitors upon expiration of the brand patents does not always 
work as intended when it comes to complex small molecule 
drugs and biosimilars. For traditional small molecules, a chem-
 
 195. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (requiring applicants to only list pa-
tents claiming the drug or its method of use, not patents on manufacturing 
methods); Woodage, supra note 93, ¶ 5 (“[C]onsideration of manufacturing 
methods will play an important role . . . in patent litigation between . . . biolog-
ic manufacturers in ways that they have not in the small-molecule drug con-
text.”).  
 196. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.  
 197. See, e.g., Michael Vella et al., Behind the Footnote in Merck KGaA v. 
Integra, PHARMACEUTICAL L. INSIGHT, Oct. 2005, at 1, 2, available at http:// 
www.mofo.com/files/Publication/e729ab19-a8f6-42fd-a4b6-2dda18b5ce8c/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3c993a04-f119-4a58-b276-dede5a9cd846/ 
0510Merck.pdf (“[P]atented drug products[’] . . . value primarily resides in 
commercial sales to the general public after FDA approval . . . .”).  
 198. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., Nos. 09 Civ. 10112(KBF), 
10 Civ. 7246(KBF), 2013 WL 3732867, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2013) (empha-
sizing that selling a patented invention to others is not a use protected under 
the safe harbor and likening such commercialization to “a square peg in a 
round hole”). 
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ical compound that comes off patent generally can be copied 
and its identity verified through basic, publicly available, ana-
lytical chemistry techniques.199 But with more complex mole-
cules, small differences in manufacturing can significantly af-
fect the end product and cause its molecular composition to 
vary.200 This potential for variation creates challenges for show-
ing bioequivalence of small molecule drugs or establishing that 
a biosimilar is “highly similar” to its reference product.201 Satis-
fying these standards may often require developing novel ana-
lytical techniques to verify the identity of each commercial 
batch of drug marketed after FDA approval.202 While develop-
ing such techniques could create significant barriers to generic 
entry, those techniques may also be eligible for patent protec-
tion and reward those entities investing in their development 
with a period of exclusivity.203
The fact that the Momenta dispute was between two gener-
ic manufacturers punctuates this new reality. Momenta sought 
to exclude other generic competitors on the basis of a patent 
wholly separate from any patents on the actual drug product, 
which had already entered the public domain.
  
204
 
 199. See, e.g., SCHACHT & THOMAS, INNOVATION ISSUES, supra note 
 Furthermore, 
the litigated patent related to a method endorsed, although not 
specifically required, by the FDA for producing the identity da-
74, at 
2–3 (“Typical pharmaceutical products consist of small molecules . . . that may 
be readily characterized and reproduced through well-understood chemical 
processes.”); see also supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.  
 200. Huub Schellekens, Biosimilar Therapeutics–What Do We Need to Con-
sider?, 2 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION PLUS i27, i28 (2009), 
available at http://ckj.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/suppl_1/i27.full.pdf+html 
(“Small changes in, or differences between, manufacturing processes may have 
a significant impact on the quality, purity, biological characteristics and clini-
cal activity of the final product.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 
1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013); Lisa S. 
Rotenstein et al., Opportunities and Challenges for Biosimilars: What’s on the 
Horizon in the Global Insulin Market?, 30 CLINICAL DIABETES 138, 139 (2012), 
available at http://clinical.diabetesjournals.org/content/30/4/138.full.pdf+html. 
 202. Ewa M. Davison & David K. Tellekson, Murky Waters: Post-Approval 
Regulatory Activities and the § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor, INTELL. PROP. BULL. 
(Fenwick & West LLP, Mountain View, Cal.), Winter 2013, at 3, 5, available at 
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Intellectual-Property-Bulletin 
-Winter-2013.pdf (“Such manufacturers may . . . seek patent protection for the 
analytical and quality control methods that they often must develop to satisfy 
FDA regulations requiring a demonstration that the biosimilar ‘is highly simi-
lar to the reference product.’”); see also Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1348.  
 203. See Davison & Tellekson, supra note 202, at 5.  
 204. Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1349–52. 
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ta necessary to maintain approval of any generic version of the 
drug.205 The additional hurdle created by the extra identity re-
quirements gave Momenta an edge over other generic rivals 
and slowed the proliferation of generic competition.206
But it is exactly this competition created by multiple gener-
ic entrants that produces meaningful reductions in price.
  
207 A 
system imposing additional patent-based barriers to market 
entry after the brand patents expire hinders subsequent en-
trants and encumbers realization of the social benefits associ-
ated with generic competition.208 Thus a public-benefit rationale 
exists for limiting the right to exclude associated with these 
added patent barriers, similar to the justifications supporting 
the safe harbor’s original enactment.209 In fact, the significantly 
higher prices associated with complex pharmaceuticals like bio-
logics mean the positive externalities associated with competi-
tion are particularly acute.210 At the same time, categorically 
limiting the safe harbor to pre-approval uses could allow patent 
protection on required post-approval manufacturing and quali-
ty control methods to completely freeze competitors out of the 
market.211
b. The Increased Costs of a Post-Approval Application  
 A pre-approval liability exception alone is therefore 
insufficient to achieve the safe harbor’s intended public benefits 
of reduced prices and increased access in a world of biologics 
and complex small molecule drugs. 
An unqualified extension of safe harbor protection to all 
post-approval activities, however, also does not adequately bal-
ance innovation and access. This approach—the approach es-
sentially endorsed in Momenta—would produce individual and 
 
 205. See id. at 1351–53.  
 206. Id. at 1351. 
 207. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1 n.4 
(“[R]esearch has shown that generic drug prices decrease relative to the num-
ber of generic manufacturers that enter the market.”). 
 208. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing the patent-
based barrier to entry ratified in Roche). 
 209. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 590 (highlighting Con-
gress’s concern with escalating drug prices and its desire to remove barriers to 
competition to control costs).  
 210. See BOURGOIN, supra note 34, at 1 (presenting both the high costs of 
biologics and the estimated cost savings from biosimilars); see also supra notes 
35–37, 40 and accompanying text.  
 211. Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1359 (expressing concern for the situation 
“where a drug has received approval, but is nevertheless kept from the market 
based on an FDA mandated testing requirement”).  
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social costs arguably outweighing the benefits associated with 
increased biologic competition. Again, the explanation rests in 
the importance of manufacturing method patents to complex 
drugs.212 These patents implicate commercial activities that oc-
cur after FDA approval in a manner dissimilar to product pa-
tents. Unlike a patented product, whose value derives primari-
ly from post-approval commercial consumption that is 
unequivocally excluded from safe harbor protection,213 a method 
patent has independent commercial value when used to pro-
duce a sellable product.214 This commercial production intrinsi-
cally implicates post-approval activities. Momenta demon-
strates that if the method generates FDA-required 
information—which it arguably often will215—extending 
§ 271(e)(1) to cover post-approval uses could shield infringers 
from liability for the entire useful lifespan of the patent.216
Permitting rivals to freely exploit the patented method al-
lows them to capitalize on the method’s commercially beneficial 
uses and produce a competing product without incurring any of 
the costs associated with developing the method.
  
217 This essen-
tially creates a free-rider situation and imposes significant in-
dividual market harm on the patentee.218 Because market harm 
correlates with the ease of substitution, the greatest risk for 
market harm with biologics stems from directly substitutable 
interchangeable biologics and closely competing biosimilars219—
the exact products the BPCIA was designed to foster.220
The potential for market harm is compounded by the safe 
harbor’s design, which forecloses several options a patent own-
er generally has when its exclusive rights are threatened. First, 
 This 
explains why the developing biosimilar market is particularly 
affected by post-approval application of the safe harbor.  
 
 212. See supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.  
 213. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.  
 214. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1351. 
 215. See id. at 1367 (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that the interpretation 
of “submission” to include record retention for inspection purposes “would al-
low almost all activity by pharmaceutical companies to constitute ‘submission’ 
and therefore justify a free license to trespass” (emphasis added)).  
 216. Id. at 1366 (“[T]his court rewrites the law to allow Amphastar to in-
fringe Momenta’s patent throughout the entire life of Momenta’s patent and for 
the purpose of obtaining profits on commercial sales of a product that competes 
with the patentee.”).  
 217. See id. at 1362.  
 218. See id.  
 219. See supra notes 146, 151–54 and accompanying text.  
 220. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.  
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the statute fails to secure a royalty or alternative remuneration 
for the patentee to offset a decrease in market share.221 Second, 
the safe harbor actually creates a disincentive to license the pa-
tented technology. Not only does § 271(e)(1) not require any 
sort of dialogue between the parties,222 but the lack of remuner-
ation hinders potential licensing agreements.223 While a patent 
owner faced with the safe harbor may be more inclined to nego-
tiate, the competitor’s incentive is reduced—the possibility of 
free, unrestricted use of the patent is apt to outweigh the terms 
of most potential licensing agreements.224 Even the threat of lit-
igation loses its luster as a bargaining tool under the safe har-
bor, as the wide array of information mandated by the FDA and 
the significant judicial expansion of the safe harbor’s scope 
have greatly increased the likely umbrella of protection for 
would-be infringers.225
Absent remuneration or a license, the primary benefit re-
tained by a patent holder faced with competition from an in-
fringer excused under the safe harbor is whatever market posi-
tion it was able to secure prior to the competitors’ entrance.
  
226 
But while the BPCIA grants a pioneer biologic a substantial 
twelve years of regulatory exclusivity,227 the first interchangea-
ble approved only receives a median period of exclusivity of 
eighteen months.228 There is no exclusivity granted for subse-
quent interchangeable products or biosimilars.229
 
 221. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also Momenta, 686 
F.3d at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).  
 These exclu-
 222. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).  
 223. Cf. Yosick, supra note 167, at 1303 (explaining that the threat of re-
muneration for excused infringement “provide[s] a strong incentive for parties 
to negotiate among themselves to reach an agreement”).  
 224. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).  
 225. See id. at 1367; supra note 215. 
 226. See, e.g., Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand-Name and Gener-
ic Drug Competition May Warrant a Revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30 
HEALTH AFF. 2157, 2158 (2011) (associating early entry and exclusivity with 
price discrimination that can lead to “substantial revenues and profits,” as 
well as the “‘first mover’ advantage, meaning that even when price is matched, 
the first [entrant] may be likely to capture a higher share of the market”). 
 227. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2006).  
 228. See id. § 262(k)(6) (providing a range of exclusivity from twelve to for-
ty-two months depending on the litigation status of the interchangeable appli-
cation at the time of the subsequent filing, with eighteen months of exclusivity 
granted for applications unencumbered by litigation).  
 229. See id.; Ronald A. Rader, An Analysis of the US Biosimilars Develop-
ment Pipeline and Likely Market Evolution, BIOPROCESS INT’L, June 2013, at 
16, 20, available at http://www.bioprocessintl.com/multimedia/archive/00219/ 
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sivity periods remain unchanged even if the follow-on manufac-
turer invests substantial time and resources developing meth-
ods to satisfy the FDA’s criteria for demonstrating “same-
ness.”230 After Momenta, the safe harbor permits later entrants 
to use those same methods to produce interchangeable or easily 
substitutable products without consideration for the timing of 
the innovator’s market entry or the opportunity for exclusive 
market occupation.231
Nowhere is the potential for extreme devaluation of these 
types of process patents by an unrestrained safe harbor more 
obvious than in the Momenta decision itself. As Judge Rader 
noted in his dissent, the unchecked application of the safe har-
bor to post-approval uses of process patents removes the patent 
owner’s right to exclude during any part of the patent life and 
“essentially render[s] manufacturing method patents worth-
less.”
 Thus the safe harbor makes it likely two 
manufacturers will be similarly situated in the market despite 
only one of them having invested the resources to produce the 
necessary technology. The result is little to no advantage—
patent or otherwise—bestowed on these forerunners of follow-
on biologic development. 
232 He concluded by emphasizing the inequities of such a 
system that “abrogates [an entity’s] hard-achieved property 
right and reallocates that entitlement to its competitors.”233
Momenta also foreshadows the corresponding decrease in 
innovation likely to accompany this extreme devaluation of 
manufacturing method patents. Because Amphastar manufac-
tured an exact substitute for Momenta’s enoxaparin product, 
the court excused otherwise infringing activities with the high-
est market significance for the patentee.
 
234
 
BPI_A_131106SUPAR02_219312a.pdf (“[B]iosimilars get no reward for being 
first to market. In fact, the first companies to file will probably bear the brunt 
of resolving patent disputes, which could cost tens of millions of dollars, allow-
ing products filed/approved later to avoid much of that trouble. The first to file 
also will probably have to face more regulatory hurdles.”).  
 The court’s liberal 
 230. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6); Rader, supra note 229, at 20. 
 231. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).  
 232. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 
(2013).  
 233. Id. at 1376 (further characterizing the development as “a sad day for 
property owners and an undeserved victory for those who decline to invest in 
the expense and difficulty of discovery and invention”).  
 234. See id. at 1351 (majority opinion) (“The approval of Amphastar’s ver-
sion of enoxaparin, and the resultant ruinous competition of another generic 
version of the drug, threatened [Momenta’s] unique market position.”); supra 
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interpretation of § 271(e)(1)’s liability exception also makes its 
applicability to similar analytical methods for demonstrating 
“sameness” not only predictable, but almost a foregone conclu-
sion.235 Together those factors create the perfect storm to deter 
would-be innovators considering investing the significant time 
and resources needed to bring a biosimilar or generic complex 
small molecule drug to market.236 They also discourage later 
entrants from innovating better methods for meeting the FDA’s 
similarity requirements.237
III.  A NEW SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK POST-
MOMENTA   
 Ultimately, Momenta makes clear 
that unchecked application of the safe harbor to post-approval 
activities fails to adequately uphold the safe harbor’s objective 
of preserving innovation.  
The time has come to take the safe harbor in a new direc-
tion. This Part reasons that § 271(e)(1)’s impact on market sig-
nificance must be readjusted to preserve an equilibrium be-
tween the costs and benefits of the safe harbor in today’s 
changing pharmaceutical landscape. While some desirable im-
provements to the safe harbor are specific to biologics, other 
ways to enhance the overall equity of the doctrine apply indis-
criminately to all pharmaceuticals. Regardless, change is re-
quired to increase the chance that the BPCIA’s abbreviated ap-
proval pathway will produce a meaningful follow-on biologic 
market that balances innovation and access.  
The complexities of the problem suggest a three-step ap-
proach. First, the BPCIA’s patent litigation procedures should 
include enhanced notification provisions that better reflect the 
types of patent protection associated with biologic development. 
Second, the FDA should delay market entry for all entities rely-
ing on safe harbor protection as a shield from infringement lia-
bility for activities related to the commercial manufacture, use, 
 
notes 144–46, 151–52 and accompanying text.  
 235. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting); supra note 167 
and accompanying text.  
 236. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting) (comparing the 
court’s outcome to “a teacher who rewards the top student by allowing her 
peers to copy her exam answers” to explain how the decision “does violence to 
patent law and future research incentives in this field”).  
 237. See, e.g., id. at 1369 (“Amphastar is free to invent its own method to 
satisfy these requirements. Instead it chooses to trespass.”); id. at 1370 (“[If] 
this court would permit copiers to infringe[, w]hat incentive remains to invest 
in inventing a better test?”).  
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or sale of a product that has obtained federal regulatory ap-
proval. This step specifically includes extending the BPCIA’s 
exclusivity provisions for interchangeable products to all follow-
on biologics. Finally, patent owners should receive a reasonable 
royalty for all safe harbor uses of their respective patents. By 
reducing the market harm to patentees, the combination of 
these compensation mechanisms should minimize potential 
barriers to innovation. 
A. LITIGATION FRAMEWORK  
A key component of the abbreviated approval pathways 
under both Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA is that they provide 
mechanisms for identifying and resolving patent disputes.238 
These dispute resolution procedures work to facilitate equitable 
competition by resolving patent challenges posed by subsequent 
competitors before the competing product is approved.239 This 
prevents market entry from being delayed by unproductive liti-
gation while identifying valid patent barriers to competition.240
The existing BPCIA provisions, however, are inadequate to 
fully embrace effective patent dispute resolution because they 
only address conflicts between the sponsors of reference prod-
uct applications and follow-on manufacturers.
 
It is during this dispute resolution process that a biologic man-
ufacturer accused of infringement might invoke safe harbor 
protection in defense of its activities.  
241 But as ex-
plained above, potential patent disputes in the biologic realm 
are not confined between reference product sponsors and manu-
facturers of follow-on products.242 Disputes can just as easily 
arise between two follow-on manufacturers.243 Although noth-
ing prevents approved follow-on applicants from relying on tra-
ditional channels to uncover potential infringement,244
 
 238. See supra notes 
 the ab-
sence of any notice mechanism increases the chance that 
66, 92 and accompanying text.  
 239. See, e.g., Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 595.  
 240. See, e.g., Ashlee B. Mehl, Note, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market 
Exclusivity for Generic Drug Manufacturers: An Entitlement or an Incentive?, 
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 649, 650 (2006).  
 241. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2006).  
 242. See supra notes 201–06 and accompanying text.  
 243. Cf. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (deciding a suit between generic manufacturers of a 
complex small molecule drug), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013). 
 244. Cf. id. at 1349–52 (resulting in patent infringement litigation despite 
the absence of notification procedures covering the patent-in-suit).  
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potentially infringing activities will not be discovered until well 
after the competing product is commercialized. Thus, in order 
to fully embrace the equities of the proposed solution, the bio-
logic dispute resolution procedures should also facilitate the 
identification and resolution of patent conflicts between these 
stakeholders. Such provisions would decrease the chance of un-
known infringement of patented manufacturing methods, bol-
stering confidence in the value of the invention.  
Helpfully, the BPCIA already incorporates a framework for 
notifying the reference product sponsor of all patents—
including manufacturing and quality control method patents—
potentially infringed by a follow-on applicant.245 The BPCIA 
should be amended to further require that subsequent follow-
on applicants give similar notice to all previously approved 
manufacturers of the particular product for which they are 
seeking approval. Although a complete assessment of the intri-
cacies of the BPCIA is beyond the scope of this Note, an effec-
tive amendment could theoretically be as simple as adding the 
language “or previously approved subsection (k) applicant(s)” 
wherever the term “reference product sponsor” appears in 42 
U.S.C. § 262(l).246
Of course, increased disclosure raises concerns about confi-
dentiality for manufacturing systems and other proprietary in-
formation. As an initial safeguard, the BPCIA protects the dis-
semination of confidential data by limiting the permitted 
recipients of such information.
  
247
 
 245. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l). 
 The proposed amendment in-
cludes a further safeguard by only requiring notice be given to 
previously approved follow-on applicants. This limitation rec-
ognizes the increased risk for improper appropriation of infor-
mation by entities competing for approval as those entities are 
actively engaged in modifying their applications. Further, be-
cause the FDA could ultimately deny both applications, the po-
tential controversy between two unapproved applicants is not 
ripe. If one manufacturer’s follow-on application is ultimately 
granted, that manufacturer could activate the disclosure re-
quirements by following procedures similar to those laid out in 
 246. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) refers to an applicant for a follow-on product as a 
“subsection (k) applicant” in reference to § 262(k), the subsection governing 
the “licensure of biological products as biosimilar or interchangeable.” See id. 
§ 262(k); id. § 262(l).  
 247. Id. § 262(l)(1).  
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the BPCIA for newly acquired patents.248
Notably, the proposed amendment does not address the po-
tential for conflict between two biologic reference product appli-
cants. It also does not provide for notification of potential in-
fringement pertaining to “method of making” patents under 
Hatch-Waxman. But in response to this first potential concern, 
a biologic approved as a reference product and not as a follow-
on product cannot be directly substituted for another product 
without prescriber intervention, lessening the threat of direct 
market competition between two reference products.
  
249 As for 
the second concern, history demonstrates that the importance 
of manufacturing method patents is the exception and not the 
norm in the context of Hatch-Waxman’s ANDA provisions.250 
And as Momenta demonstrates, traditional methods for discov-
ering infringement still exist for those infrequent instances in-
volving the few complex small molecule drugs where manufac-
turing method patents might play a role.251
B. MARKET EXCLUSIVITY
 
252
A second way to restore equity to the safe harbor is to 
counteract a liability exception granted for activities related to 
the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of an FDA-regulated 
product with a period of market exclusivity for the patent hold-
er. Thus, when the safe harbor protects these commercial activ-
ities, the FDA should be required to stay approval of the other-
wise-infringing entity’s application. If the competing 
application is already approved, the FDA should suspend it. 
Similar to the BPCIA’s current provisions granting exclusivity 
to the first interchangeable biologic, the period of exclusivity 
should depend on the approval and litigation status of the pa-
  
 
 248. See id. § 262(l)(7) (requiring notice of all potentially infringed patents 
within thirty days of the newly acquired right).  
 249. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.  
 250. See supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text (explaining how man-
ufacturing method patents have not been important for small molecule drugs 
under Hatch-Waxman).  
 251. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 
(2013). 
 252. Although referred to as market exclusivity for convenience, the pro-
posal embodied in this section envisions scenarios where the recipient of the 
“exclusivity” term is not in fact the exclusive market player (or even the exclu-
sive generic or biosimilar manufacturer). Nonetheless, delayed approval of 
competitors creates some form of exclusivity for the recipient as compared to 
those later market entrants. 
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tent holder’s application.253 In this vein, a system mimicking 
these highly scrutinized exclusivity periods in the BPCIA might 
be sufficient—providing exclusivity for twelve months after the 
first commercial marketing of the patentee’s product, eighteen 
months if the product has yet to be commercialized but is unen-
cumbered by litigation, or forty-two months if litigation is ongo-
ing.254
Set exclusivity periods may not be workable in all conflict 
permutations, however. Because of the potential for cross-
litigation in a field with multiple follow-on entrants, a defined 
period of exclusivity obtained in litigation with one competitor 
may expire while locked in litigation with another. Accordingly, 
a period based on independent expert review that accompanies 
a safe harbor determination may be more desirable. Nonethe-
less, even with defined exclusivity periods the proposed solu-
tion provides benefits over the status quo by preventing a free-
rider from usurping market share from the patentee. Although 
exclusivity periods already exist for brand-name small molecule 
drugs,
  
255 biologic reference products,256 the first generic ANDA 
filer,257 and the first interchangeable biologic,258 this proposal 
would further promote innovation and market entrance by sub-
sequent interchangeable biologics, biosimilars, and complex 
small drug manufacturers.259 Moreover, entities wanting to cir-
cumvent an imposed period of exclusivity may be incentivized 
to innovate alternatives to patented methods for satisfying 
FDA requirements.260
This prong of the solution eases the burden of the safe har-
bor on the primary benefit conferred upon a patent holder—the 
right to exclude. As noted above, elimination of this right under 
the safe harbor can either be temporary or persist for the entire 
life of the patent.
  
261
 
 253. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6). 
 Delaying market entry of competitors bene-
fiting from a liability exception granted under the safe harbor 
reintroduces the concept of exclusivity.  
 254. Id. 
 255. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). 
 256. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2006). 
 257. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  
 258. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6). 
 259. See supra notes 212–16 and accompanying text (explaining how these 
entities are most likely to be affected by commercially significant applications 
of post-approval safe harbor protection).  
 260. Cf. supra note 237 and accompanying text.  
 261. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.  
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Market exclusivity is a common incentive in the world of 
pharmaceuticals and FDA regulation, and its frequent use 
highlights its commercially significant benefits.262 For tradi-
tional small molecule pharmaceuticals, early market entrance 
is a strong predictor of success and profits.263 Market exclusivi-
ty is expected to have an even stronger correlation with success 
or failure in the field of follow-on biologics, and the availability 
(or lack thereof) of market exclusivity may determine whether 
or not the abbreviated pathway for follow-on biologics takes 
hold.264 Since direct competition from less expensive substitutes 
lowers drug costs, success of the abbreviated pathway for bio-
logics is key to reducing health care costs in this expanding 
field.265
Importantly, the proposed solution does not limit this rem-
edy to follow-on biologics, much less interchangeable biologics 
or even BPCIA-regulated products. Momenta demonstrates 
that the safe harbor indiscriminately imposes its inequities and 
can have significant commercial implications for certain small 
molecule drugs.
  
266
C. REASONABLE ROYALTY  
 In response, indiscriminate market exclusivi-
ty for all commercial applications of the safe harbor is desira-
ble. As the class of pharmaceuticals most likely to be impacted 
by commercial applications of the safe harbor, however, follow-
on biologics can be expected to benefit most from this remedy.  
Finally, the imposition of a reasonable royalty for all safe 
harbor uses would reduce the inequities caused by § 271(e)(1)’s 
invariable creation of “free-riders” that receive the benefits of 
innovation without incurring any of the costs. To be effective, a 
royalty must be high enough to ensure the patentee realizes 
some profits but low enough to allow for price competition by 
 
 262. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Pro-
mote Pharmaceutical Innovation, 19 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1855 (2010). 
 263. David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 
87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 37, 39 (2005) (“If a [generic pharmaceutical] firm ob-
tains early approval, it is likely to earn a positive return on its application-
related costs, whereas firms obtaining approval later in the process are likely 
not to recover their sunk costs.”). 
 264. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note 
33. 
 265. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 266. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 
(2013). 
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the excused infringer.267 Imposing a royalty in this “sweet spot” 
should preserve incentives to innovate while still creating 
meaningful reductions in drug price.268 Importantly, the exist-
ence of the royalty alone may actually reduce safe harbor law-
suits by encouraging parties to negotiate a license and forgo lit-
igation.269 And in situations where negotiations are 
unsuccessful or impractical, courts can readily impose the roy-
alty alongside a judicial determination that the safe harbor ap-
plies.270
With the importance of setting an effective royalty rate in 
mind, opponents of reasonable royalties often lament the diffi-
culty of determining their value.
  
271 Specifically, it can be prob-
lematic to determine the infringed patent’s value to both the 
patent owner and the infringer.272 This is particularly challeng-
ing in a context of a liability exception permitting ongoing be-
havior because the royalty applies not only to past infringe-
ment but also to any future infringement that occurs while the 
exception endures.273
This difficulty alone, however, is no justification for em-
bracing an inequitable and detrimental status quo that pro-
vides no compensation. Moreover, valuation of reasonable roy-
alties is a common occurrence.
 Because the protection granted by the safe 
harbor has the potential to last the entire duration of the pa-
tent, adequately predicting the future value of the patent is es-
pecially important for preserving the incentive to innovate.  
274
 
 267. See Yosick, supra note 
 For example, judicial 
determinations of non-injunctive relief in antitrust and patent 
infringement suits provide precedent for setting royalty 
167, at 1303.  
 268. See id. 
 269. Id. at 1298, 1303.  
 270. See id.  
 271. Id. at 1298.  
 272. Methodologies for Determining Reasonable Royalty Damages, FISH & 
RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/reasonableroyalty/ (last visited Mar. 10, 
2014).  
 273. See Neal E. Solomon, What Is a Reasonable Royalty? A Comparative 
Assessment of Patent Damages Methodologies 3 (June 11, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1623982 (arguing that reasonable royalties tend to “undervalue patents by an 
ex post facto view of future and unknowable markets”). 
 274. Richard F. Cauley, Defunding the Trolls: Attacking the Damages 
Claim, IP LAW 360 (Portfolio Media, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 14, 2008, at 1, 
available at http://www.whglawfirm.com/CM/Articles/Defunding%20the% 
20Trolls.pdf (“The most common award for patent infringement . . . is a ‘rea-
sonable royalty’ . . . .”). 
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rates.275 In this context, experts can often assist in valuing the 
patent.276
Indeed, federal regulation makes the pharmaceutical in-
dustry well-suited to expert valuation of royalties.
 
277 Because 
the date of entry of the generic can be determined in advance, 
“the size of the potential revenue in each market can be pro-
jected with some accuracy.”278 A reasonable royalty based on 
market potential can then be calculated by extrapolating that 
data based on the number of entrants at any given time.279
The possibility that some stakeholders will no longer be 
able to afford to innovate if required to pay for the technology is 
another primary justification for excluding royalties from the 
safe harbor.
  
280 The concern is that research and development 
often implicates several patents held by multiple companies 
and that a need to pay each company to use the relevant pa-
tents may outweigh the value of any potential end-product of 
the research.281 This argument is amplified in contexts where 
the research is targeted at developing an intermediary product 
or research tool that has little or no commercial value in and of 
itself.282
 
 275. Yosick, supra note 
 In those situations, an inventor faced with one or more 
167, at 1303; see, e.g., Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 
F.3d 1098, 1109–10 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing the calculation of reasonable 
royalties); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900–02 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); see also Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Ply-
wood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing fifteen factors 
courts may consider in determining a reasonable royalty), modified, 446 F.2d 
295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971). See generally Methodolo-
gies for Determining Reasonable Royalty Damages, supra note 272 (providing 
an overview of several methodologies for assessing reasonable royalties). 
 276. See generally Glenn S. Newman et al., How Reasonable Is Your Royal-
ty?, J. ACCT., Sept. 2008, at 56 (detailing considerations for experts assisting in 
calculating royalties).  
 277. See Reiffen & Ward, supra note 263, at 37 (“[B]ecause a market begins 
when the patent on an existing drug expires, the date at which the market 
opens to competitors is known in advance and the potential revenue can be 
projected with some accuracy . . . .”). 
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. 
 280. Cf. Freeburg, supra note 42, at 410 (“A common objection to compulso-
ry licensing is that it reduces the incentive to invent . . . .”).  
 281. Cf. id. at 412 (“Reach-through royalties, where licenses can continue 
to collect fees on downstream inventions . . . . could create a problem of royalty 
stacking . . . .”). 
 282. Id. (“[R]oyalty stacking . . . is probably not a good suggestion unless 
the end product actually contains the research tool.”). 
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restrictions on the right to exclude may simply choose to aban-
don the research altogether.283
This argument, however, is of decreased relevance among 
pharmaceutical manufacturers as the end research goal is gen-
erally a commercial product with the potential for significant 
market returns.
  
284 Moreover, a case-by-case royalty amount, ra-
ther than a fixed rate, mitigates these concerns and allows for 
adjustment of the remedy in each specific situation to better 
promote the safe harbor’s goals. For one thing, individual royal-
ty awards mean less commercially valuable or less frequently 
used technology can be priced accordingly.285 And while safe 
harbor protection does not turn on a lack of non-infringing al-
ternatives, a case-by-case approach permits consideration of 
available alternatives when setting the rate. Imposing a lower 
royalty rate when faced with significant technological hurdles 
and a single means for meeting the FDA’s standards could less-
en an otherwise high barrier to market entry.286 On the other 
hand, a higher royalty rate could shift activities to non-
infringing alternatives if they exist. At the very least, a higher 
rate rewards subsequent innovators in situations of competing 
alternatives, which may encourage even more innovation.287
  CONCLUSION   
 Ul-
timately, it is this type of flexible system that will best balance 
the costs of innovation against the costs of increasing access to 
affordable medication.  
While the safe harbor once operated to balance innovation 
and the public interest, market changes and an increasingly 
broad judicial interpretation of § 271(e)(1) have given rise to 
the need to revisit its application. In effect, the Federal Cir-
 
 283. Id. (describing how royalty stacking can negatively affect downstream 
inventions).  
 284. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 285. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) (explaining that patents on re-
search tools have not been proven to impede development because their lim-
ited commercial value corresponds with minimal compensation for patent 
owner), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013). 
 286. See id. at 1360 (majority opinion) (expressing concern that an FDA 
requirement for a single testing method will produce a complete barrier to 
market competition). But see id. at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting) (supporting the 
argument that a higher rate could incentivize the development of alternative 
techniques for meeting requirements).  
 287. See id. at 1370 (discussing the importance of retaining means for in-
centivizing improvements).  
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cuit’s endorsement of the safe harbor’s application to post-FDA-
approval activities in Momenta has the potential to devalue an 
entire class of key manufacturing method patents related to the 
quickly developing field of biopharmaceuticals by authorizing 
unchecked infringement of the patents for commercial purpos-
es. In addition to impacting individual drug markets, the ex-
panded scope of safe harbor protection for significant commer-
cial activity is likely to stifle innovation in an increasingly 
important field of the pharmaceutical industry, negatively im-
pacting the overall public health and welfare.  
The underlying justifications and positive practical effects 
of the safe harbor can be retained, however, if the statute is 
adapted to compensate entities whose patent rights are im-
pacted. In addition to enhanced notification provisions for re-
vealing potential infringement among follow-on manufacturers, 
that compensation scheme should include both a reasonable 
royalty for all safe harbor applications and a period of exclusiv-
ity for patentees faced with excused post-approval commercial 
infringement of their invention. By allowing patent owners to 
recoup some of their costs and develop their respective mar-
kets, the potentially lucrative return on investment driving 
current levels of pharmaceutical innovation will be preserved 
for years to come.  
 
